The Rabin-Montgomery Crypto Suite
Based on the asymmetric cryptosystem by Michael O. Rabin (1979) Augmented by a method from Peter Montgomery (1985) to avoid the division of long numbers in modular arithmetic Allows cost and energy efficient implementation by combining the Rabin and Montgomery algorithms Allows non-traceable and confidential identification and authentication Does not require a private (secret) key to be stored in a tag the tag performs only efficient public key operations Time consuming private key operations need only be performed by the interrogator Can be combined with symmetric mutual authentication, based on AES Secure UHF Tags with Strong Cryptography February 19th, 2013 Slide 8
How the RAMON Tag Authentication Works
RAMON is a public key protocol, using four different keys: A public key K E , used for encryption. This is the only key stored on the tag A private key(-set) K D , used for decryption This key is only stored in a secure memory in the interrogator An optional key set K s , K V ,used to validate a signed UID As the data length might exceed the buffer capacity of tag or interrogator, response messages are chained First response chunk is delivered while ongoing encryption produces more data consecutively Optimised transaction time 
Information Flow with RAMON Tag Authentication
Optional steps and components are indicated with a dashed line .
Step n of the information flow n 
Basics: Montgomery Modular Multiplication
The Montgomery approach allows a much more efficient calculation of the cipher text C in the tag.
Cipher text C*: Reader Tag
Encryption:
Residue R is a power of 2 and . In other words, R is at least the next power of 2 which is larger than n. Step 1: The interrogator challenge is delivered to the tag. The tag immediately starts with the cryptographic calculation and answers with the length of the response data which will be calculated. Step 2: The interrogator retrieves the remaining fragments by chaining.
Once the interrogator has retrieved the entire record, it is able to authenticate the tag. In
Step 1, the interrogator challenge is delivered to the tag. This message is used to request the tag to perform authentication. In
Step 2, the interrogator retrieves the remaining fragments by chaining further Authenticate commands and responses. Once the interrogator has fetched the entire authentication record it is able to authenticate the tag. 
